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Abstract
We contribute to the scarce literature focusing on the life outcomes of disabled
people in Central and Eastern European Countries by estimating the effects of
disability on employment probabilities for six Central and Eastern European
Countries. We find that disability negatively affects the employment probabilities of
disabled people, especially those with severe disabilities. The effects of disability
persist even after controlling for disability benefits, signaling a predominant role for
disability per se. The long-term effects of disability are smaller than the short-term
effects, suggesting the partial integration of disabled people into the labor market
over time, which might favor both social inclusion and a country’s economic
performance.
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1 Introduction
Disabled people are disadvantaged in many socioeconomic dimensions. The European
Disability Strategy 2010–2020 (European Commission 2010) aims to empower people
with disabilities, by eliminating barriers in eight areas, i.e., accessibility, participation,
equality, employment, education and training, social protection, health, and external
action, for which specific key actions are identified.
Among different dimensions, the labor market dimension has mostly attracted the
interest of researchers and policy makers because of the poor labor market perform-
ance of disabled people. It has been emphasized that supporting the labor market inte-
gration of disabled people would be important for a number of reasons, such as
favoring social inclusion and increasing income and providing for a more productive
labor supply and for the positive effects of economic output in the long term (OECD
2010).
The related literature has mainly focused on developed countries, such as the UK
(Kidd et al. 2000 and Jones et al. 2006), Ireland (Gannon 2005), Australia (Oguzoglu
2010), and Italy (Agovino et al. 2014 and Addabbo et al. 2014), while Mussida and
Sciulli (2015) proposed a comparative analysis for four major EU countries (Italy,
Spain, France, and the UK). Finally, Mizunoya and Mitra (2013) investigated the situ-
ation in developing countries. All of these studies found a negative impact of disability
on employment (or labor market participation); the magnitude of which varies across
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countries and gender. In addition, some evidence has indicated the existence of long-
term effects of disability on employment and the relevance of educational integration
and achievements for disabled people.
Despite the conditions of disabled people being particularly difficult in Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) (see Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova 2013), quantita-
tive analysis focusing on transition economies has been scarce (Mete 2008). This paper
seeks to fill this gap by offering new empirical evidence about the relationship between
employment and (different levels of ) disability in CEEC. It has been emphasized that
disabled people, who were usually institutionalized or marginalized in special schools
under the Soviet system, suffered a worsening of their living conditions during the tran-
sition era because of the disruption of the health system and the reduction in financing
for residential institutions (Mete 2008).1
Furthermore, at least during 1990s, labor policies privileged demand side policies, ig-
noring supply side interventions aimed at integrating disabled people into the labor
market (World Bank 2005). Despite the improvement in the economic performances of
CEEC in the new century and the introduction of policies favoring the employment of
disabled people (ANED 2009), labor market gaps between disabled and non-disabled
people have remained relevant.
Disability can affect employment through various mechanisms that, in principle, can
increase or decrease the labor supply. For example, special/additional consumption re-
quirements (She and Livermore 2007) or the adoption of active labor market policies
can increase the labor supply of disabled people (e.g., Eichhorst et al. 2010). Neverthe-
less, the income effects related to the reception of disability benefits, the substitution
effect deriving from the higher opportunity costs of working that are associated with
disabilities, and lower job-search intensity due to higher mobility costs decrease the
labor supply of disabled people. In addition, special time requirements for self-care/re-
habilitation activities associated with disability increase the marginal utility of leisure,
decreasing the labor supply of disabled people (Mizunoya and Mitra 2013). Finally,
from a demand-side perspective, employers would be less likely to hire disabled people
because of their suspected lower productivity, the additional costs of adjusting work-
places to meet disability requirements, and prejudice and/or discrimination.
We aim at disentangling this empirical puzzle for transition countries by analyzing
six CEEC members, namely, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
and Romania. Therefore, we provide new evidence about the sign and the extent of the
net impact of disability on the employment probabilities resulting from the joint action
of the different mechanisms discussed above. In addition, we pay specific attention to
the role of disability benefits in affecting the employment probabilities of disabled
individuals.2
The analysis is based on the 2007–2010 longitudinal component of the European
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data, which allows for a
homogenous definition of disability based on the information about daily activity limi-
tations. This identification strategy has been adopted in a number of related papers
(e.g., Gannon 2005 and Oguzoglu 2010), allowing for a better comparison with previous
results. In addition, this approach allows us to define disability in the spirit of the social
model, which exceeds the medical model of disability. In particular, the social model of
disability suggests that disability is not confined only to impairments, but it also
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depends on their interrelations with the external environment and technical assistance.
However, because of the self-reported nature of daily activity limitations, we cannot ex-
clude that estimations are affected by self-reporting bias; robustness checks regarding
the validity of our results are provided in a specific section.
Using panel data enables us to model an employment equation accounting for state
dependence and to distinguish the shorter- and longer-term effects on the employment
opportunities for disabled individuals. In addition, because the initial conditions are
likely not to be assigned randomly to the individual, we allow for endogeneity by esti-
mating the employment equation using Heckman’s estimator (1981). Finally, with the
aim of identifying the role of the receiving of disability benefits in the employment op-
portunities of disabled people, we run an alternative specification considering the joint
effect of disability benefits and disability status by introducing specific interaction
dummy variables.
The estimation results show that disability negatively affects the employment oppor-
tunities of prime-age individuals in the six CEEC analyzed. The effect is particularly
great in magnitude in cases of high disability, ranging from 11 % for Romania to 25 %
for Lithuania, which are generally higher values than those of Western countries,
whereas they were similar to those observed in Anglo-Saxon countries.3 We also find
that receiving disability benefits, according to theoretical predictions, strongly reduces
the employment opportunities of disabled people. Nevertheless, disabled people not re-
ceiving disability benefits remain significantly penalized in terms of employment
opportunities.
Our results suggest that there is space in CEEC to reduce the employment gap be-
tween disabled and non-disabled people. In this context, the effects of disability benefits
on the labor supply of disabled people should be considered, with positive effects on
different dimensions of socioeconomic activities, including the social inclusion of dis-
abled people and the economic performances of countries involved in the integration
process.
Section 2 provides the econometric approach used, Section 3 describes the data and
the samples and offers testing for the reporting bias problem, Section 4 discusses the
results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The econometric model
The probability of an individual i being employed at time t is estimated using the fol-
lowing random effects dynamic probit model (on a balanced sample):
yit ¼ γyit−1 þ x′itβþ δDISit þ λDISit−1 þ αi þ uit
yit ¼ 1 yit > 0
  ð1Þ
with i = 1,…, N indicating the individual and t = 2…T the time periods. The dependent
variable yit is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the individual i is employed
at time t. The inclusion among covariates of the previous employment status, yit−1, al-
lows us to disentangle the contribution to employment opportunities of unobserved
heterogeneity and past employment (state dependence), and it allows us to interpret
our model as a first-order Markov process. xit is a vector of control variables, β is a vec-
tor of unknown parameters to be estimated, αi is the individual specific and time invari-
ant random component, and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. We assume that both αi
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and uit are normally distributed and independent of xit and that there is no serial cor-
relation in uit.
In addition, we include a vector of disability dummy variables DISit, indicating in turn
one’s own disability (D) and one’s own strong disability (SD). Those dummy variables
allow us to measure the direct impact of different levels of disability on individual em-
ployment probability. Furthermore, we also include lagged variables of one’s own dis-
ability (DISit−1) into our model, which allows us to disentangle the shorter- and longer-
term effects of disability on employment opportunities or the direct effects of past work
limitations. Finally, δ and λ indicate two vectors of unknown parameters estimated to
be related, respectively, to current and past disability dummy variables.
Equation (1) assumes exogenous initial conditions and therefore independence be-
tween αi and yit−1. However, because it is most likely that the initial employment status
is not randomly assigned to the individual, estimates obtained from Eq. (1) would be
inconsistent. With the aim of providing consistent estimates, we follow the method
proposed by Heckman (1981), which explicitly considers the initial conditions problem
by approximating the unknown initial conditions with a static equation, using informa-
tion from the first wave available in the data. The so-called initial conditions problem
arises when the start of the observation period does not coincide with the start of the
stochastic process. Wooldridge (2005) also proposed an estimator to account for initial
conditions problem in non-linear dynamic random effects models. However, the litera-
ture (e.g., Akay 2012) has shown that Heckman’s estimator performs better for short
panels; therefore, we rely on it in our paper.
The Heckman estimator requires a simultaneous two-stage procedure. In the first
stage, a reduced form equation, approximating the conditional distribution of the initial
conditions, takes the following form:
yi1 ¼ 1 z′i1π þ ξ i1 > 0
  ð2Þ
where zi1 is a vector of exogenous variables that can include xi1 control variables and
DIS1 is a disability dummy variable, an additional instrument, where:
ξ i1 ¼ θα1 þ ωi ð3Þ
with ξi1 correlated with αi but uncorrelated with ωi for t > 1.
The joint probability of the observed binary sequence for individual i, given the unob-
served heterogeneity term, is


























where F is the distribution function of α/σα and σα ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ρ= 1−ρð Þp . With α considered to
be normally distributed, the integral over α/σα can be evaluated using Gaussian-
Hermite quadrature.
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To obtain an estimate of the extent of state dependence and of the direct impact of
one’s own disability on the probability of being employed, as well as, in general, to
present the results as percentage effects, we must calculate the average partial effect
(APE) of the lagged dependent variable yit − 1 on P(yit = 1), following the method sug-
gested by Stewart (2007). The method used here is based on estimates of counterfactual






















The APEs are given by: APE ¼ p^j−p^0
3 Data and sample
We base our analysis on data from the EU-SILC survey. The EU-SILC is a rotating
panel survey based on methodologies and definitions harmonized across most members
of the European Union (Eurostat 2010). The topics covered by the survey encompass
living conditions, income, social exclusion, housing, work, demography, and education.
The survey is conducted in each country by its National Institute of Statistics; the
sampling designs and operational details adopted are similar, with residual differences
reflecting the different traditions of the various national institutes and specific objec-
tives added by national governments.
We select data for Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Romania for the time window 2007–2010. In principle, the 2007–2010 longitudinal
EU-SILC data should allow us to investigate Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria as
well. Unfortunately, once the panel is constructed, and missing data are considered, the
number of related observations is too small to perform econometric analysis. Neverthe-
less, the remaining countries are representative of (economic, institutional, historical,
and cultural) the heterogeneity characterizing CEEC.
The rotating scheme of the survey indicates that each sampled household remains in
the sample for 4 years, and this structure reduces the phenomenon of attrition, i.e., the
unit non-response of eligible persons or households that occurs after the first wave of
the panel (Rendtel 2002). As suggested by Eurostat (2010), we checked for the presence
of attrition by examining the variable that provides information about membership sta-
tus (RB110 in the official coding of EU-SILC variables). People were asked whether they
were in the same household in previous waves (current household members) or not
(not current household members) and whether and why they moved into/out of the
household since the previous/last wave. By combining this information with that ob-
tained from variables providing information about “to where the person moved”
(RB120 in the official coding of EU-SILC variables), we can reasonably exclude that
there is attrition among our data.
We focus on the population interviewed in the period 2007–2010, aged between 25
and 60 years old. The models are estimated separately by country. The effective
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(balanced) sample sizes are 11,786 in Poland, 3580 in Lithuania, 4996 in Czech Repub-
lic, 5524 in Slovakia, 6740 in Hungary, and 6388 in Romania.
We are interested in the estimation of the effects of different levels of disability on
employment opportunities. Table 1 displays the employment rates computed for our
(balanced) samples by country for each level/degree of activity limitation of the individ-
ual.4 There is a gap between the employment rates and the opportunities of non-
disabled and disabled people, especially those with strong limitations in daily activities.
The individuals affected by high disability are indeed disadvantaged (lower employment
probability) in all of the countries examined, although to different extents. Romania
and Lithuania show the largest gaps between the employment rates of non-disabled
people and disabled individuals (40.15 p.p. in Romania and 35.29 p.p. in Lithuania), es-
pecially if affected by strong activity limitations (69.25 p.p. in Romania and 70.17 p.p.
in Lithuania). Employment disadvantages for disabled (and especially highly disabled)
people are also noticeable in the other countries analyzed, i.e., Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Slovakia, and Hungary. This finding emphasizes that a reduction of the impacts
of disability on individual employment opportunities might be a necessary policy inter-
vention to enhance labor market participation (and subsequently the employment pros-
pects/opportunities) in these countries.
Table 2 reports summary statistics by country for the variables used in the economet-
ric analysis throughout the overall period examined. The dependent variable is the em-
ployment rate/probability.
Our analysis of the effects of disability is based on individuals’ self-reported limita-
tions in activities because of health problems at the time of the interview (PH030 in
the official coding of EU-SILC variables, Eurostat 2010). We use dummy variables for
disability and strong disability. Past employment accounts for state dependence,
whereas lagged disability allows us to distinguish the effects on employment opportun-
ities of shorter- and longer-term disability.
Examining the prevalence of disability, on average (Table 2), approximately 14 % of
individuals in our samples report activity limitations (disability). The percentage
(portion) ranges from 10.4 % in Romania to 18.1 % in Slovakia. A different picture
emerges for strong disability. The average percentage is clearly lower, i.e., approxi-
mately 4.5 %. The country with the lowest percentage is the Czech Republic, i.e.,
approximately 3 %, while the country with the highest incidence is Hungary, where
the percentage exceeds 6 %.
The quantitative analysis controls for a list of variables, including age, defined accord-
ing to four age groups (25–34; 35–44; 45–54; and 55–60)5 and three educational vari-
ables defined according to UNESCO’s International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED), distinguishing among education completed in the lower secondary
Table 1 Employment rates by country and level of disability, 2007–2010
Poland (%) Lithuania (%) Czech Republic (%) Slovak Republic (%) Hungary (%) Romania (%)
No disability 78.23 84.86 84.75 87.82 78.85 75.85
Disability 49.70 49.56 53.27 74.45 44.25 35.69
Strong
disability
18.98 14.69 26.14 29.96 16.78 6.60
Note: Employment rates computed on balanced samples
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
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stage (ISCED 0–2), upper secondary education (ISCED 3), and post-secondary or ter-
tiary education (ISCED 5–7). Dummy indicators for marital status and the presence
and number of children in the household by age, i.e., 0–3 years old and 4–15 years old,
as well as equalized household income deflated at 2007 prices,6 are also included in the
model. The business-cycle effect is controlled for by introducing the local unemploy-
ment rates.7 This step is particularly recommendable in our analysis because both the
sign and the extent of business cycle variation were particularly relevant in the period
analyzed. For identification purposes, the initial conditions equation of the estimated
models includes a variable measuring the relative change in local unemployment rate
between 2006 and 2007, possibly affecting employment probabilities in 2007 but not in
later years.






Employment 0.723 0.769 0.790 0.825 0.694 0.686
Employment time 1 0.728 0.788 0.797 0.830 0.693 0.687
Disability
No disability 0.835 0.823 0.844 0.768 0.777 0.851
Disability 0.127 0.128 0.126 0.181 0.160 0.104
Strong disability 0.038 0.049 0.031 0.050 0.063 0.045
Disability benefit 0.082 0.114 0.100 0.071 0.136 0.079
Female 0.520 0.527 0.533 0.539 0.561 0.534
Age
Age [25, 34] 0.201 0.170 0.235 0.246 0.201 0.217
Age [35, 44] 0.288 0.301 0.282 0.255 0.317 0.299
Age [45, 54] 0.349 0.376 0.289 0.358 0.320 0.314
Age [55, 60] 0.162 0.153 0.193 0.142 0.162 0.171
Education
None, elementary, or lower secondary 0.119 0.101 0.093 0.065 0.167 0.218
Upper secondary 0.655 0.299 0.775 0.719 0.575 0.578
Post-secondary or tertiary 0.227 0.600 0.132 0.215 0.258 0.193
Married 0.783 0.730 0.646 0.713 0.645 0.762
Number of kids 0–3 0.088 0.051 0.076 0.066 0.065 0.033
0.300 0.225 0.272 0.265 0.251 0.189
Number of kids 4–15 0.640 0.487 0.485 0.479 0.585 0.481
0.888 0.795 0.768 0.803 0.886 0.858
Local unemployment rate 9.210 10.350 5.951 11.400 9.852 5.540
1.460 5.617 2.403 1.745 2.851 0.953
Equivalised household income 4.778 5.177 7.262 5.873 4.832 2.480
3.996 3.649 3.662 2.687 2.334 1.816
Delta unemployment rate
2006–2007
−30.455 −26.414 −25.009 −16.22 −0.828 −12.252
4.253 3.395 3.828 2.941 5.375 7.046
Observations 11,796 3580 4996 5524 6740 6388
Notes: Standard deviations in italics for continuous variables
The full specification also include yearly time dummies
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
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Finally, in the Appendix (Table 6), we report some descriptive characteristics of dis-
ability benefits received by disabled individuals in the analyzed countries. The incidence
(in the whole sample) ranges between 7.1 % (Slovakia) and 13.6 % (Hungary). The inci-
dence is higher when focusing on disabled people. Particularly, it ranges between
18.1 % (Slovakia) and 46.4 % (Czech Republic) for disabled people and between 57.8 %
(Slovakia) and 71.2 % (Lithuania) for highly disabled people. The average amount of
disability benefits is relatively low and ranges between 1200 euros per year (Romania)
and 3300 euros per year (Czech Republic). The differences in the average amount of
disability benefits received by disabled and highly disabled people are relatively small.
3.1 Tests
Our analysis is based on individuals’ self-reported limitations in activities because of
health problems at the time of the interview (PH030 in the official coding of EU-SILC
variables, Eurostat 2010). The information on activity limitations is an individual’s self-
assessment of whether he or she is limited in his or her usual activities, including “ac-
tivities people usually do,” by any ongoing physical or mental health problem, illness,
or disability for at least the previous 6 months. The individuals are also asked about
their level of limitation/disability, absence of limitations, limitations, and strong
limitations.8
Nevertheless, because disability is self-reported, and a self-reporting bias problem
might arise (see Kerkhofs and Lindeboom 1995 and Hernández-Quevedo et al. 2005,
for similar problems with self-reported health),9 we test the robustness of our measure-
ment of disability using specific investigations. Particularly, we run a sort of consistency
test between self-reported information about limitations in daily activities and self-
reported information about different measurements of general health status (PH010 in
the EU-SILC questionnaire)10 and chronic illness (PH020).11 The ratio of the test is that
the stronger the correlation is among different measurements of disabling/poor health
conditions, the higher the reliability is of “limitations in daily activities” in identifying a
real disabling condition. In other words, the test is based on the hypothesis that the
probability an individual serially lying on declarations in simultaneous disabling/poor
health conditions indicators is low; consistency among alternative self-reported mea-
surements of disabling/poor health conditions is an indicator of the validity of “limita-
tions in daily activities” for identifying a truly disabling condition.
The cross-controls between disability and this information are shown for all of the
countries analyzed in the graphs (Figs. 1 and 2) in the Appendix. The values of rho
(correlation) between disability and health status are rather high, ranging from 0.55 in
Poland to 0.65 in Hungary (Fig. 1). The values of the correlations are even higher if we
consider disability, especially strong disability, and chronic illness. The values of these
correlations are, on average, greater than 0.90 in the six countries (Fig. 2). This test is
quite reassuring regarding the validity of our measurements of disability/activity limita-
tions to capture the phenomenon of disability itself because they are robust to both
subjective and objective alternative measurements.
Another concern with our analysis is related to the possibility that unobserved indi-
vidual factors simultaneously drive employment and disability variables. We test this
circumstance estimating the correlation (rho) between the error terms in a two-
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simultaneous equation framework, in which employment and disability equations are
estimated jointly using, respectively, a dynamic pooled probit model and a dynamic
pooled ordered probit model (see Table 7, Appendix). The correlations between the
error terms are relatively weak, negative, and significant. This finding suggests, in
agreement with expectations, that there is a negative and weak correlation between
self-reported disability and employment. This finding would be indicative that non-
Fig. 1 Correlations between disability and health. Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
Fig. 2 Correlations between disability and chronic illness. Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
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employed individuals would be more prone to reporting a disability status to justify
their employment conditions. However, the estimation results are consistent with those
obtained using our benchmark model,12 reassuring us of the validity of our estimates.
Finally, we run a test of the robustness of the cut-point shifts of our self-perceived
measurement of disability with regard to a number of relevant explanatory variables,
following the technique suggested by Contoyannis et al. (2004). The systematic use of
different threshold levels by subgroups of a population would reflect the existence of
reporting bias (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004; Murray et al. 2001). These differ-
ences might be influenced by, among other factors, gender, age, and education, indicat-
ing that different groups appear to interpret the question within their own specific
context and therefore to use different reference points when they are responding to the
same question. If the reporting bias is due to a cut-point shift, this fact indicates that
there is a change in the relative positions of the reporting thresholds for particular sub-
groups of the population, resulting in a change in the overall distribution of self-
reported disability.
The test investigates the issue of self-reporting bias by dividing the sample of all of
the countries examined into subsamples based on gender, age (<45 and >45), and high-
est attained educational qualification (primary, secondary, or tertiary13 educational at-
tainment level). For each subsample, we estimate dynamic random effects ordered
probit models, controlling for initial conditions and correlated effects. Our findings
(Table 8, Appendix) confirm that the relevance/effect/impact of disability, as measured
by the magnitude and sign of the APE for lagged disability, does not change signifi-
cantly (in terms of sign and significance) once we divide our samples by gender, age,
and education. This finding is true for all of the countries analyzed. That is, the distri-
bution of responses to the disability question across gender, age, and education across
countries is very similar. Our measurement of disability is therefore robust to alterna-
tive subsamples’ estimates (and specifications) and, in general, to self-reporting bias.
4 Results
4.1 The effects of disability on employment probabilities
The main estimation results are presented in Tables 3 and 4, in which we report the
average partial effects of being disabled on employment opportunities. In Table 3, we
distinguish between disability and strong disability and between the shorter- and
longer-term effects of disability. Table 4 reports an estimation of the joint effect of dis-
ability and disability benefits on the employment opportunities of disabled people, as
measured by the introduction of specific dummy interaction variables (see Section 4.2).






Time t Disability −0.058*** −0.111*** −0.071*** −0.026*** −0.049*** −0.038***
Strong disability −0.144*** −0.250*** −0.190*** −0.118*** −0.136*** −0.111***
Time t−1 Disability −0.027* −0.017 −0.015 −0.003 −0.043*** −0.035***
Strong disability −0.106*** −0.147*** −0.037 −0.030 −0.093*** −0.049***
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
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In the Appendix, Table 9 reports the estimated coefficients of the initial condition
equations, and it also includes the estimated θ parameters, which provide us with a
measurement of the correlation between initial employment status and unobserved fac-
tors. Their significance suggests the relevance of adopting a random effects dynamic
probit model accounting for endogenous initial conditions (as suggested by Heckman
1981), rather than assuming exogenous initial conditions.
Estimation of the control variables is presented in the Appendix (Table 10), and we
found quite standard effects with few exceptions. These findings include evidence of
state dependence (even after controlling for endogenous initial conditions) ranging
from 0.35 in Poland to 0.47 in Slovakia and decreasing to 0.12 in Lithuania, perhaps be-
cause of the strong increases in unemployment rates in the period under investiga-
tion.14 We also find evidence of lower employment probabilities for women (negative
impact ranging from 1.3 % in Lithuania to 7.2 % in Poland) and for older workers, a
negative impact of having children aged 0–3 years old in the household, and greater
employment opportunities for better educated and higher-income individuals. The de-
mand side indicator (the local unemployment rate), also catching the economic slow-
down effects, shows the expected negative sign. When focusing on disability effects, it
is essential to note the high significance and magnitude of both current and strong dis-
ability. As shown in Table 3, the impact of current disability on employment opportun-
ities ranges from −2.6 % in Slovakia to −11.1 % in Lithuania. We find intermediate
effects in Romania (−3.8 %), Hungary (−4.9 %), Poland (−5.8 %), and the Czech Repub-
lic (−7.1 %). The negative impact is much greater when focusing on strong disability,
ranging from −11.1 % in Romania to −25 % in Lithuania.15 Intermediate impacts exist
in Slovakia (−11.8 %), Hungary (−13.6 %), Poland (−14.4 %), and the Czech Republic
(−19 %). Comparing these effects with those reported in the related literature (e.g.,
Gannon 2005; Oguzoglu 2010 and Agovino et al. 2014), we find that the detrimental im-
pact of disability is greater in the CEEC analyzed than in the Western nations (Mussida
and Sciulli 2015).16







Time t Disability −0.031*** −0.071*** −0.039*** −0.031*** −0.011 −0.020*
Disability*receiving
disability benefit
−0.106*** −0.120*** −0.109*** −0.083*** −0.159*** −0.227***
Strong disability −0.107*** −0.144*** −0.074** −0.056* −0.059** −0.116***
Strong disability*receiving
disability benefit
−0.052 −0.254** –0.291*** –0.233*** –0.215*** n.a.
Time t−1 Disability −0.011 0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.024** −0.023*
Disability*receiving
disability benefit
0.009 −0.050* 0.002 0.007 −0.015 −0.044
Strong disability −0.031 −0.085** −0.081** −0.060** −0.032 −0.034
Strong disability*receiving
disability benefit
−0.048 −0.037 0.082*** 0.071*** −0.029 n.a.
Note: Second, fourth, sixth, and eight rows refer to estimated coefficients of interaction dummy variables between
disability status and disability benefit
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
n.a. not available
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
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It should also be noted that strong disability is the most negative factor impacting
employment opportunities among those considered in our analysis. Relevant negative
impacts have also been found for individuals limited in daily activities but not severely.
These preliminary considerations should suggest to policy makers the relevance of
adopting specific policies aimed at increasing the integration and retention of disabled
people in the labor market, especially of women, older people, less educated people,
and people with strong activity limitations,17 as a potential factor promoting the social
inclusion of individuals and higher effectiveness of Central and Eastern European econ-
omies. Labor market participation and especially employment are indeed considered
relevant factors of integration into society (Warren 2005).
The relevant impact of disability on labor market outcomes is also confirmed when
examining the longer-term effects of disability. With the exception of the Czech and
Slovak Republics and Lithuania, for a non-strong disability level, we find that past dis-
ability significantly and negatively affects current employment opportunities. The nega-
tive effect ranges between 2.7 % for Poland and up to 3.5 % for Romania and 4.3 % for
Hungary. When focusing on strong disability, the negative impact is 4.9 % for Romania
and increases to up to 9.3 % for Hungary, 10.6 % for Poland, and 14.7 % for Lithuania.
The magnitude is smaller when compared to that related to the shorter-term effects of
disability, suggesting that partial integration into the labor market of disabled people
involves working overtime. Given this interpretation, the integration process over the
medium-to-long term would be particularly effective in the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics, possibly indicating the implementation of powerful labor policies for disabled indi-
viduals (for instance, the Czech Republic has promoted both long-term support during
job searches and training courses for disabled people in recent years).
Our results also indicate that mechanisms involving a negative impact of disability on
employment, on average, prevail over positive impacts. For example, we cannot discard
the hypothesis that disabled people would be likely to increase their labor supply (even
more if not strongly disabled) to meet their special consumption requirements better and
that employment policies (e.g., active labor market policies, including training schemes
and employment subsidies) contribute to the (partial) integration and inclusion of dis-
abled individuals in the labor market.18 Nevertheless, negative mechanisms prevail, and
the total net negative effect of disability on employment varies across countries, according
to the different magnitude of each specific factor at work in each country.
On the one hand, people receiving disability benefits are likely to reduce their labor
supply, also according to the level of monetary transfers. On the other hand, there are
a number of underlying mechanisms possibly decreasing the employment opportunities
of disabled people that deserve active governmental interventions. Among the factors
lowering the employment prospects of disabled people, we numbered supply and de-
mand side factors concerning the higher opportunity costs of working and the higher
mobility costs for disabled people. Public support for workplace adjustments to firms
would be helpful in increasing the employment probabilities of disabled people (e.g.,
Newton and Ormerud 2005). It has also been shown that individuals with mobility
problems are those who atone for a greater reduction in re-employment opportunities
(Sciulli et al. 2012). This finding suggests that policies removing obstacles/barriers to
the mobility of people with disabilities would be effective in promoting their employ-
ability, especially in CEEC, where disability because of reduced mobility is relevant.
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In addition, because disabled people require special time requirements for self-care/
rehabilitation activities, flexible and/or reduced working hours would better fit the
needs of disabled people, and they would be helpful in increasing their integration into
the labor market. It is relevant to note that part-time work is common among disabled
people who are employed.
Recent labor market and welfare policy developments in European countries have
seen an increased focus on the possibilities of partial work and job flexibility, including
shorter working hours (e.g., part-time job), and possibilities for more flexible attend-
ance (OECD 2007). In Poland, for instance, legal rights were enacted to ensure, de-
pending on the degree of disability, the right to work of disabled people. Additional
efforts for flexible working hours and conditions, therefore, will be crucial for the labor
market participation of disabled people.
Finally, although anti-discriminatory policies have been implemented in many coun-
tries (as recommended by the EU Directive of 2000),19 and the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been largely ratified, monitoring their actual im-
plementation seems to be necessary.20
4.2 The role of disability benefits
This section presents evidence on the role of receiving disability benefits in the
employment opportunities of disabled individuals in CEEC. There are remarkable
institutional differences in the procedures adopted in these countries for the diag-
nosis and certification of disability and the provision of disability benefits. For
these reasons, we offer a detailed description of the eligibility criteria for disability
benefits (either temporary or permanent and from work injuries as well), diagnosis/
certification and delivery of disability benefits, accumulation of earnings from work,
employment quotas reserved for disabled individuals, and incentives for employers
in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Table 4 reports related the average partial effects of explanatory variables, obtained
by interacting disability dummy variables (disability and strong disability, respectively)
with a dummy variable taking the value of one in case the individual is receiving a dis-
ability benefit and zero otherwise (disability and benefit interaction and strong disability
and benefit interaction).
Generally speaking, when focusing on the shorter-term effects of disability, we
find that receiving a disability benefit strongly reduces the probability of being
employed for both disabled and highly disabled individuals. The negative impact
ranges from −8.3 % (Slovakia) to −22.7 % (Romania) for disabled people and from
21.5 % (Hungary) to 29.1 % (Czech Republic) for highly disabled people. Receiving
a disability benefit, in the short term, reduces the employment probabilities of dis-
abled individuals by up to three or four times. It is also relevant to combine these
results with the differences between countries in the opportunities for the accumu-
lation of disability benefits with earnings from work or, in other words, whether it
is possible to accumulate wages and disability benefits when a disabled individual
starts working/performs gainful activity. The evidence is mixed. Whereas the accu-
mulation is possible in Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, in the other
three countries analyzed, we find some restrictions. These data help to explain the
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strong negative impact on employment in Romania and Hungary. The disabled in
these countries might therefore prefer to remain in their conditions and receiving
benefits (either temporary or permanent) instead of starting to work and losing
their benefits, even if partially in some cases (see Table 5).
It should be noted that, although receiving disability benefits contributes import-
antly to reducing the employment opportunities of disabled people, disability per
se preserves a significant role in determining the employment prospects of individ-
uals. The employment probability of disabled individuals not receiving a disability
benefit is 2 % less than that of non-disabled individuals in Romania and increases
to up to 7.1 % in Lithuania. When focusing on strong disability, this pure negative
effect ranges from 5.6 % (Slovakia) to 14.4 % in Lithuania.
Our findings about the role of disability benefits are in agreement with theoretical
predictions, for which receiving monetary transfers lowers the labor supply of disabled
individuals (e.g., Gruber 2000), especially in countries where the accumulation of dis-
ability benefits and earnings is not possible or is limited.
However, although this finding is well founded theoretically, we must consider
that this explanation is not completely exhaustive. In fact, receiving a disability
benefit is usually conditioned on a medical decision certifying the existence of an
impairment, limiting individual activities in a serious and permanent manner.21
This conclusion indicates that, while the self-reported information about daily ac-
tivity limitations is also determined by the interaction of impairments with external
factors, focusing on the subsample of individuals receiving disability benefits in-
volves a shift toward a medical conception of disability, for which only seriously
impaired individuals are considered. An empirical consequence of this definition
would be the increase in the extent of the negative impact of disability on employ-
ment probabilities. From another perspective, because the medical certification con-
sists of an external evaluation of disability, its exogeneity ensures us considerably
regarding the reduced risk of incurring self-reporting bias.22
When focusing on past disability indicators, we find more mixed effects. First, we
find a pure negative effect of disability or strong disability on employment opportun-
ities. In particular, as a longer-term effect of disability (associated with the absence of
disability benefits), we find a reduction in employment opportunities by 2.3 % in
Romania and 2.4 % in Hungary. In addition, the longer-term effect of disability on the
highly disabled (but not receiving disability benefits) reduces employment oppor-
tunities by 6 % in Slovakia, 8.1 % in the Czech Republic, and 8.5 % in Lithuania.
Interestingly, among the longer-term effects of disability, we find the canonical
negative impact because of the receiving of disability benefits only for Lithuanian
disabled individuals (−5 %). Conversely, we find a positive longer-term impact on
the employment opportunities of highly disabled individuals receiving disability
benefits in the Czech and Slovak Republics (respectively, by 8.2 and 7.1 %), coun-
tervailing the negative impact due to disabling conditions.
In summary, the analysis of the role of disability benefits in the employment
prospects of disabled people is revealing in different aspects. First, according to the
standard interpretation and consistent with theoretical predictions, receiving dis-
ability benefits strongly reduces the employment opportunities of disabled individ-
uals, possibly raising questions about the nature and structure of monetary
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transfers in the perspective of building incentive schemes to increase the labor
supply of disabled people, as well as because, as we have explained above, the im-
possibility or limitations of the accumulation of disability benefits and earnings
strongly reduce employment opportunities.
Second, although the impact of receiving disability benefits is sizeable, we still find
evidence of pure negative effects because of disabling conditions. In other terms, dis-
ability per se significantly reduces the employment opportunities of the analyzed indi-
viduals. Third, when examining the longer-term effects of disability, the impact seems
to be mixed across countries.
5 Conclusions
Disabled people are disadvantaged in many socioeconomic dimensions, and their con-
ditions are particularly difficult in Central and Eastern European Countries, which have
suffered a worsening of their standards of living during the transition era. Despite these
considerations, the related evidence has been scarce.
This paper contributes to fill this gap by offering new empirical evidence for the rela-
tionship between employment opportunities and disability in CEEC. Disability has been
defined according to the self-reported information about limitations in daily activities,
in the spirit of the social model of disability. Robustness checks for self-reporting bias
have been provided.
The importance of promoting employment for disabled people is twofold because,
first, it favors social inclusion and increases the income of disabled individuals and, sec-
ond, it provides for a more productive labor supply and has positive effects on eco-
nomic output in the long term.
Our empirical approach offers the estimation of a random effects probit model
accounting for state dependence and endogenous initial conditions, to assess the
shorter- and longer-term effects of disability in six CEEC. In this context, we
consider different levels of disability and evaluate the joint impacts of disability
and disability benefits. We find evidence of a negative impact of disability on em-
ployment probabilities, with different extents across the countries analyzed. The
negative effect sometimes almost doubles that found in Western and Anglo-
Saxon countries. The negative impact is greater in cases of strong disability. In
addition, the shorter-term impact of disability being greater the longer-term ef-
fects on disabled individuals suggests partial integration into the labor market of
disabled people over time. Receiving disability benefits strongly contributes to re-
ducing the employment opportunities of disabled people, consistent with theoret-
ical predictions of the role of monetary transfers in the labor supply.
Nevertheless, we also find that disabled people not receiving disability benefits
are significantly penalized in terms of employment opportunities, suggesting a
predominant role of disability per se in determining a negative impact on em-
ployment probability.
Our results suggest that there is space in CEEC to reduce the employment gap
between disabled and non-disabled people, resulting in positive effects in different
dimensions of socioeconomic activities, including the social inclusion of disabled
people and the economic performances of countries involved in the integration
process.
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As shown in the related literature, this integration process requires the implementa-
tion of specific policies. Our results suggest that interventions might affect the struc-
ture of disability benefits because they support incomes, but they might also decrease
the labor supply of disabled people and their relatives. In addition, as suggested by
other studies, best practices to favor the inclusion of disabled people might include re-
moving barriers to the mobility of disabled people, flexible jobs/working conditions and
working hours, support for employers making workplace adjustments, and the enforce-
ment of anti-discrimination legislation.
Endnotes
1Eurostat statistics confirm that social expenditure, particularly related to sickness
and health care, is lower in CEEC and that no significant changes have been imple-
mented during the economic downturn.
2For a detailed description of the institutional differences in procedures adopted in
these countries for diagnosis, certification of disability and provision of disability bene-
fits, see Table 5 in the Appendix.
3The negative effect of strong disability on employment is, on average, approximately
9 % in Italy, 4 % in France (Mussida and Sciulli 2015), and 8 % in Australia (Oguzoglu
2010). In the UK, the effect increases to approximately 27 % (Berthoud 2011) and in
Ireland to 18 % (Gannon 2005).
4The definitions of employment and non-employment do not match the ILO defini-
tions. On the EU-SILC questionnaire, the respondents are indeed asked to self-define
the main economic status of the current year. They are asked whether they are work-
ing, unemployed, or in retirement or early retirement, have given up business, or are
another category of inactive person (Eurostat 2010).
5Disability and therefore the probability of reporting activity limitations, as also em-
phasized by the European Commission (2010), increase with individual age. We there-
fore decided not to include in our analysis elderly people, i.e., people older than
60 years old. We also attempted to reduce our upper age limit further to 55 years old,
but given that the results of our estimates did not change, we decided to keep 60 years
of age as the upper limit.
6The equalized household income is computed starting from the total disposable
household income, variable HY020, using the within-household non-response inflation
factor, HY025, and the equalized household size, hhsize. The income is computed in
thousands as follows: eqhhincome = (HY020*HY025)/(hhsize*1000). It is also deflated
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by ISTAT.
7These figures are available on the Internet athttp://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/
show.do?dataset=lfst_r_lfu3rt&lang=en.
8Based on this information, we built our dummy variables on disability status (see
Section 4).
9Reporting bias has been a concern in the literature and can be defined as the differ-
ential reporting of disability (activity limitations) across individuals or groups of indi-
viduals with the same disability status.
10The variable PH010 provides information about self-perceived health, which is clas-
sified as very good, good, fair, bad, and very bad.
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11The variable PH020 indicates whether the individual suffers from any chronic
(long-standing) illness or condition. Like health (PH010), it is self-perceived.
12The estimation results are not reported for the sake of brevity. Nonetheless, they
are available upon request.
13Table 8 reports the estimates by gender. For the sake of brevity, we did not report
the results for age and education. Nonetheless, they are available upon request.
14The unemployment rate increased in all of the countries analyzed during the
period under investigation, especially in Lithuania and Slovakia. In Lithuania, the
unemployment rate increased from 4.2 % in 2007 to 17.8 % in 2010, whereas in
Slovakia, it increased from 11.1 % in 2007 to 14.4 % in 2010. These figures are
available on the Internet athttp://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?data-
set=lfst_r_lfu3rt&lang=en. See Cuestas et al. (2011) for a study of transition
countries.
15Interestingly, the employment rate remained stable in Romania during the period
analyzed (approximately 58.8 %), whereas it decreased significantly in Lithuania, ran-
ging from 65 % in 2007 to 57.6 % in 2010, suggesting that the reduction in employment
rates primarily affected the employment opportunities of (strongly) disabled individuals
in Lithuania. These figures are available on the Internet athttp://appsso.eurostat.ec.eur-
opa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfst_r_lfu3rt&lang=en.
16Cross-country differences, both within CEEC and between West and East-
Central, have various explanations, including differences in labor demand struc-
ture and the distribution of disability types. For example, disabled people, because
of workplace characteristics, might experience lower employment rates in those
countries where the agricultural and industrial sectors are particularly relevant. In
addition, employment probabilities might vary because of different types of dis-
ability, according to adaptability to workplaces, related mobility difficulties, and
social stigma.
17These findings are confirmed by the ANED (2009) national reports and by detailed
studies of the situations of disabled people (e.g., APPLICA et al. 2007).
18According to ANED (2009), while sheltered employment increased in many EU
countries, it decreased in others, including Poland.
19The Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, among other things, af-
firms that the “provision of measures to accommodate the needs of disabled people at
the workplace plays an important role in combating discrimination on the grounds of
disability.”
20Country-specific recommendations concerning the implementation and the effect-
iveness of anti-discriminatory policies have been sent to many countries. For details,
see ANED (2009).
21This is somewhat confirmed by examining the distribution of disability benefits
across different disability statuses, for which only 1/3 of disabled individuals receive a
disability benefit, while the number of recipients increases to approximately 2/3 when
focusing on greatly disabled individuals.
22It should be noted that applying for disability benefits usually requires effort and
ability to negotiate bureaucracy. It follows that less educated individuals are less likely
to apply for disability benefits, possibly contributing to underestimating the negative
impact of receiving a disability benefit for disabled individuals.
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Table 5 Institutional differences across countries in procedures for the diagnosis, certification of disability, and provision of disability benefits




Social insurance system Social insurance and social
assistance system









disability pension: paid for a
total disability (incapacity
for any work) or partial
disability (greatly impaired
earning capacity or total
incapacity for usual work).
Permanent or partial
disability pension: paid for a
total disability (loss of
working capacity of 75 to
100 % or 55 to 74 %) or
partial disability (loss of
working capacity is from 45
to 54 %).
Permanent or partial
disability pension: Paid for a
total disability (70 % loss of
earning capacity) or partial
disability (from 50 to 69 %
loss of earning capacity).
Permanent of partial
disability pension: Paid for a
total disability (at least a
70 % loss of earning
capacity) or partial disability
(at least a 40 % loss of
earning capacity).
Permanent or partial
disability pension: paid for a
total disability, 100 % loss of
working capacity and need
for permanent care by
others; 100 % loss but no
need for permanent care;
partial disability for at least
a 67 % loss.
Permanent or partial
disability pension: Paid for a
total disability (assessed with
a permanent disability and
incapacity for any work) or
partial disability (loss of at












A medical examiner of the
Social Insurance Agency and
a general practitioner








Temporary: 100 % of
average earnings in the
6 months before the
disability began is paid from
the first day for up to
26 weeks.Permanent: if the
insured has a total disability,





Temporary: 100 % of the
insured’s average earnings
and paid from the first day
of disability until the date of
certification of permanent
disability.Permanent: for a
loss of working capacity of at
least 30 %, benefit is based
on 50 % of the percentage
of loss in working capacity,
compensation coefficient
and insured income level.
Temporary: lump sum is paid
equal to the difference
between the insured’s
average earnings before
work injury and full amount
of sickness
benefit.Permanent: full
pension paid for a total
permanent disability (66.7 %
loss of earning capacity or
more). The monthly pension
is based on average gross
earnings before disability.
Temporary: from the 1st to
the 3rd day of incapacity,
55 % of the insured’s daily
assessment basis is paid;
thereafter, 25 %.Permanent: if
the insured has an assessed
loss of earning capacity of at
least 40 %, the monthly
benefit is the product of
80 % of the assessment.
Temporary: monthly benefit
75 % of old-age pension
paid to the insured at the
normal retirement age.
Permanent: value of
pension varies: 100 % loss
of working capacity and
need for permanent care
provided by others; 100 %
loss but no need for
permanent care; and at
least a 67 % loss.
Temporary: The benefit is
80 % of the insured’s average
wage in the 6 calendar
months before the disability
began and is paid from the
first day of disability for up to
180 days a year.Permanent:

























reduced if the beneficiary
works: a) earnings below
70 % national average
wage: no effect on pension;
b) earnings between 70 and
130 % national average
wage: basic amount of the
pension reduced by 24 or
18 % in case of partial
disability pension; c)







continue to work, wages are
paid.
Disability benefit terminated
in cases where the eligible
person performs gainful
activity and his/her income
regarding 3 consecutive
months respectively







not permitted with earnings
from work if employed for
more than half of the full









Employers with 25 or more
employees must meet a
quota of 6 % disabled
persons. In case of non-
compliance with quota,
employers face a penalty of
40.65 % of average wages
for each disabled person
that should have been
hired. For workers disabled
from work injury, employers
must arrange suitable
workplace within 3 months
after the employee declares
readiness to return to work.
In case of dismissal of such
employee, the employer
must pay a fee equal to
15 month’ s salary.
Enterprises with 50 or more
workers are obliged to
employ 2–5 % of disabled
persons with a reduction in
capacity for work by at least
60 % or disabled with
moderate disability. If
employers do not fulfill this
obligation, they pay a
contribution equal to 15
times the official minimal
wage.Every additionally
created workplace for a
disabled person is subsidized
by the Employment Fund by
an amount related to the
national minimum wage for
a maximum period of 1 year
and a half.
Employers with a workforce
of over 25 employees are
obliged to employ disabled
persons in a proportion of
4 % of the total number of
the employees.Employers





includes more than 50 % of
disabled, or making
payments to the State
budget.Employers whose
workforce includes more
than 50 % of disabled
receive a contribution to
support the employment of
these persons.
Employers with 20 or more
employees (with the
exception of the police and
security forces of the State)
must employ at least 3.2 %
disabled persons. If not, the
employer pays 0.9-times the
total average wage per year
per vacancy for which a
disabled person should have
been hired.Calculation: 1
person whose capacity for
work has been reduced by
more than 70 % compared
to a healthy person = 3
disabled persons. Employers
pay lower health insurance
contributions for their
disabled employees: 5 %
instead of 10 %.
It is mandatory for each
employer with 25 or more
employees, to fill 5 % of all
posts with persons with
disability. If this obligation is
not met, the employer must
pay contribution.Support
from the Central Budget: for
employers who hire
persons with disability (who
have lost at least 50 % of
their working capacity and
do not receive pension
benefits in respect of their
invalidity or old-age) for at
least 1 year. The amount of
the support varies according
to the duration of
employment.
A standard quota (4 %) is
directed to both public and
private employers. The small
employers (with less than 50
employees) are exempted
from the quota obligation.
The employers who fail to
meet the quota obligation
are charged compensatory
levies for each person with
disabilities under the quota
level or buying for the same
amount products and
services from the sheltered
enterprises.The employers
are entitled to tax incentives
and wage subsidies.
aIn all countries, the provision of benefits is related to seriousness of disability. In all countries, with the exception of Hungary, the disability pension ceases at the normal pensionable age and is replaced by the
old-age pension
















Table 6 Characteristics of disability benefit by seriousness of disability





Whole sample Incidence 0.082 0.114 0.100 0.071 0.136 0.079
Average amount 2274.12 1702.93 3494.44 2374.18 2273.91 1178.33
Disability Incidence 0.314 0.373 0.464 0.181 0.426 0.291
Average amount (AAD1) 2230.77 1833.29 3280.07 2288.23 2268.97 1214.67
Strong disability Incidence 0.651 0.712 0.651 0.578 0.702 0.653
Average amount (AAD2) 2446.04 1837.78 4037.86 2649.11 2294.34 1135.93
H0: AAD2 > AAD1 (P value T stat) 0.002 0.488 0.000 0.004 0.368 0.947
Table 7 Endogeneity test: correlation between error terms of employment and disability equations
rho s.e.
Poland −0.202 0.032 ***
Romania −0.294 0.057 ***
Hungary −0.241 0.036 ***
Czech Republic −0.293 0.049 ***
Slovak Republic −0.239 0.048 ***
Lithuania −0.340 0.052 ***
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
Table 8 Average partial effects on probability of reporting activity limitations for dynamic random
effects ordered probit by gender
Men Women
APE s.e. APE s.e.
Poland
Lag disability 0.310 0.005 *** 0.307 0.005 ***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.005 0.010 0.020 0.011 *
[45, 54] 0.040 0.009 *** 0.056 0.010 ***
[55, 60] 0.067 0.010 *** 0.077 0.011 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.023 0.009 * −0.029 0.009 ***
High education −0.056 0.012 *** −0.056 0.010 ***
Lithuania
Lag disability 0.292 0.009 *** 0.295 0.009 ***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.040 0.021 * 0.039 0.022 *
[45, 54] 0.054 0.020 *** 0.084 0.020 ***
[55, 60] 0.083 0.021 *** 0.109 0.021 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.035 0.016 * −0.045 0.021 *
High education −0.081 0.017 *** −0.087 0.020 ***
Czech Republic
Lag disability 0.291 0.010 *** 0.295 0.009 ***
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Table 8 Average partial effects on probability of reporting activity limitations for dynamic random
effects ordered probit by gender (Continued)
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.008 0.018 0.011 0.019
[45, 54] 0.047 0.017 *** 0.061 0.017 ***
[55, 60] 0.076 0.017 *** 0.088 0.017 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.043 0.018 * −0.038 0.015 *
High education −0.055 0.023 * −0.050 0.022 *
Slovak Republic
Lag disability 0.358 0.008 *** 0.383 0.007 ***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.038 0.017 * 0.082 0.018 ***
[45, 54] 0.093 0.015 *** 0.115 0.016 ***
[55, 60] 0.157 0.017 *** 0.155 0.018 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.046 0.022 * −0.039 0.020 *
High education −0.057 0.025 * −0.059 0.022 *
Hungary
Lag disability 0.334 0.007 *** 0.332 0.007 ***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.055 0.015 *** 0.044 0.016 ***
[45, 54] 0.114 0.015 *** 0.118 0.015 ***
[55, 60] 0.161 0.016 *** 0.152 0.015 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.044 0.013 *** −0.076 0.011 ***
High education −0.079 0.016 *** −0.128 0.013 ***
Romania
Lag disability 0.297 0.008 *** 0.319 0.008 ***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
[35, 44] 0.027 0.014 * 0.078 0.017 ***
[45, 54] 0.073 0.014 *** 0.115 0.016 ***
[55, 60] 0.121 0.014 *** 0.176 0.016 ***
Education: reference—primary
Medium education −0.016 0.011 −0.030 0.010 ***
High education −0.031 0.013 * −0.064 0.014 ***
Unbalanced samples
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data







Age [35–44] 0.394 *** 0.055 3.245 ** 0.903 ** 0.828 *** 0.220
Age [45–54] 0.021 −0.171 3.557 *** 0.490 0.709 * −0.554 **
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Table 9 Estimated coefficients of initial employment status equation of the Heckman model by
country, 2007–2010 (Continued)
Age [55–60] −0.854 *** −0.302 −0.775 −0.999 ** −0.105 −2.044 ***
Upper secondary 0.585 *** 0.281 0.409 1.826 *** 1.352 *** 0.881 ***
Post-secondary or tertiary 1.182 *** 0.700 * −1.467 2.144 *** 1.169 *** 2.026 ***
Married 0.453 *** 0.464 * 0.349 0.671 ** −0.134 0.230
Number of kids 0–3 −0.289 * −0.756 * −7.988 *** −0.922 ** −2.024 *** −0.878 *
Number of kids 4–15 0.039 −0.021 −1.683 * −0.040 −0.271 * −0.043
Local unemployment rate −0.110 * −0.040 0.110 −0.005 0.746 * −0.349
Equivalised household
income (.000)
0.150 *** 0.317 *** 1.235 *** 0.483 *** 0.758 *** 0.779 ***
Female −1.133 *** −0.463 * −10.911 *** −0.780 *** −1.326 *** −1.503 ***
Disability −0.928 *** −0.668 *** −14.386 *** −0.897 ** −2.456 *** −1.935 ***




0.023 * −0.068 ** 0.070 −0.132 *** −0.333 * 0.013
Constant 2.261 *** 0.315 14.601 ** −1.533 −8.031 * 2.160
ρ 0.39 *** 0.61 *** 0.079 ** 0.086 0.16 *** 0.209 **
θ 1.92 *** 0.94 *** 5.577 ** 5.962 * 5.54 *** 4.380 **
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data






Employment t−1 0.354*** −0.119*** 0.441*** 0.472*** 0.358*** 0.426***
Female −0.072*** −0.015 −0.045*** −0.030*** −0.033*** −0.039***
Age: reference—[25, 34]
Age [35, 44] 0.017 0.017 0.025** 0.024** 0.004 0.013
Age [45, 54] −0.006 −0.002 0.023* 0.015 −0.020* −0.024**
Age [55, 60] −0.112*** −0.025*** −0.053*** −0.051*** −0.087*** −0.079***
Education—reference: primary
Upper secondary 0.042*** 0.039* 0.029** 0.061*** 0.026* 0.039***
Post-secondary or tertiary 0.086*** 0.104*** 0.040** 0.071*** 0.041*** 0.060***
Married 0.038*** 0.023* 0.002 0.004 −0.005 −0.006
Number of kids 0–3 −0.026* −0.044* −0.180*** −0.092*** −0.134*** 0.023
Number of kids 4–15 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 −0.007 −0.001
Local unemployment rate −0.006*** −0.003*** −0.003** −0.005*** −0.002* −0.004
Equivalised household income 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.015***
# observations 11,796 3580 4996 5524 6740 6388
*Significant at the 10 % level; **significant at the 5 % level; ***significant at the 1 % level
Source: our elaborations of EU SILC data
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